

English Heritage Battlefield Report: Adwalton Moor 1643

Adwalton Moor (30 June 1643)

Parishes: Leeds, Bradford, Kirklees

Districts: Leeds, Bradford, Kirklees

County: West Yorkshire

Grid Ref: SE 213290

Historical Context

The English Civil War soon resolved itself into a series of regional struggles as both Royalists and Parliamentarians endeavoured to gain control of as much territory as possible. In the North the Parliamentary cause was upheld by Ferdinando, Lord Fairfax: his stronghold was the cloth towns of the West Riding of Yorkshire. Opposed to him were the Royalist forces marshalled by the landowning magnate the Earl of Newcastle. The Royalists were superior in numbers but the Parliamentarians possessed the most competent soldier, Sir Thomas Fairfax (Lord Fairfax's son). For some months Sir Thomas's generalship had kept the enemy at bay, but in June 1643 Newcastle led 10,000 men against Bradford. Convinced that the town could not withstand a siege, Lord Fairfax led between 3000 and 4000 men out to oppose the Royalists.

Location and Description of the Battlefield

Adwalton Moor battlefield is situated four miles from Bradford alongside the A650 road to Wakefield. The fighting took place on a ridge running between Westgate Hill and the summit of Adwalton Moor one and a half miles to the southeast.

About half the battlefield is today built over. The area that has long been known as Adwalton Moorside is still largely intact and is preserved as an area of common ground. Elsewhere the majority of open land is used for farming although some of this has been given over recently to the new Adwalton and Drighlington by-pass.

Landscape Evolution

Documentary and field evidence indicate that the ridge running north-west from the present day Adwalton Common was covered in 1643 with hedged fields which, on high ground such as this, were probably down to permanent pasture. Some of the hedges through which fighting happened appear still to survive; the hedge line running south-west from the Tong Lane End to Inmoor Duke junction appears to be species rich for example.

Contemporary accounts of the battle refer to "old coal pits". Knowing the location of these is of great value, as the source material for the battle makes clear. Old Coal pits are clearly marked on the 1852 O.S. map and some remain in the present day landscape as water filled round ponds, the remains of primitive "bell pit" mines. These mines are especially well marked around the area now called the Plantation (called Pit Hole Plantation in 1854). There seems little doubt that these are the pits referred to in 1643. There is no evidence of woodland on the battlefield area in 1643.

Further east, beyond the coal pits, were more enclosed fields, now lying between the Plantation and what is now the A58. Some of the 1643 enclosures may remain as poor-condition hedge lines with 3-4 woody species (e.g. the hedge line running south from the western edge of the Plantation).

Contemporary accounts of the battle speak of a 'great ditch and bank' in this area. It is possible that the two small ditches running across the battlefield here were once bigger, and the westernmost one still runs down the possibly old hedge line mentioned above from the western edge of the present day Plantation. In 1643 a well maintained hedge and ditch here would have proved an obstacle to Royalist cavalry, although no bank remains today.

The old hedges lying east of the present Plantation indicate the open moor of Adwalton in 1643 began approximately where it does today. Adwalton Moor was an open area of rough common grazing for surrounding agricultural communities with possibly some small-scale coal mining on it. There is no mention of any major settlement here in 1643, although Adwalton with its 'Old Hall' (1854 O.S. map) may have been a hamlet. In addition, commons frequently attracted fringing squatter hovels which could have been there in 1643. South of Adwalton, outside the battlefield area, lay what appear to be early enclosed medieval arable open fields. It is probable these had already been enclosed by 1643.

Through this pattern of enclosed fields and moor on the hill top ran a series of tracks. Apart from the present A58 line, all follow old lines and could have been there in 1643. Battle accounts specifically mention the Parliamentary right escaping down a lane running towards Halifax from the moor itself. Field and map evidence indicate present day Warren Lane, leading towards Oakwell Hall, could be this route. Hodgson Lane, running close to the southern boundary of the battlefield area also follows an old line, not cutting across the local field systems, and could have been present in 1643.

The essentially enclosed nature of the landscape adjoining the open common does remain despite later developments. These included, before 1848, the planting of a group of trees within one of the enclosures full of old coal pits. This was called Coal Pit Plantation in 1854 and is now called the Plantation. The coal pits remain as water filled hollows and the moor is now an open area of common surrounded by the industrial community of Drighlington. This has been growing steadily, initially around steam mills shown in 1848, to almost totally surround the moor today.

By 1854 a railway had been built along the southern boundary of the battlefield area with a station next to Tong Moor. This is now abandoned and is in part followed by a new road which also cuts across the western part of the battlefield area.

By 1848 the present day A58 had been constructed, cutting across older field patterns west of the Moor, and the old Bradford road (now the A650) had become a turnpike road. Warren Lane and Hodgson Lane, the latter fragmentary due to modern road widening, still exist, whilst the road running south from present day Cross Lane Ends was a turnpike road in 1852.

The coal mining in the area developed into a colliery by 1854 called Oakwell Colliery, lying just west of Warren Lane, though there is little evidence of it today.

The first Ordnance Survey map of the area (Published 1852, surveyed 1847) shows the extent to which the battlefield has been built over in the past 150 years. Drighlington was just a few houses congregated around what is now the crossroads of the A650 and A58. Adwalton village too was little larger; the sprawl on the northern slopes of Adwalton Hill, reaching as far as the summit, consists of post-war housing.

The Sources

The Battle of Adwalton Moor has been largely overlooked by historians. The few writers who have attempted a description of it have generally done so in the context of a biographical study of the main protagonists. With one recent exception the reader will not find Adwalton Moor included in any book of British battlefields¹. Otherwise, to date, the only two writers who have essayed an account of the battle for its own sake in recent years are Brigadier Peter Young and Lt-Colonel A.H. Burne, co-authors of *The Great Civil War: A Military History of the First Civil War 1642-1646* (London 1959). The Parliamentary sources will be considered first.

Although in the past Fairfax's *A Short Memorial of Northern Actions During the War There, From the Year 1642 Till 1644*² has been the basis of most accounts of the Battle of Adwalton Moor, another almost equally useful source is the report written by Thomas Stockdale for Speaker William Lenthall the day after the action³. While Sir Thomas Fairfax commanded one wing only, Stockdale was riding with Lord Fairfax, who was in command overall. Stockdale gives an excellent breakdown of the Parliamentary army into forlorn hope, van, main battle and rearguard, naming commanders and identifying the localities from which different contingents of troops were raised. It is also possible, from his description, to estimate the relative numbers of each component of the 4000-strong Parliamentary army.

... with this strength we ... marched from Bradford against the enemy who lay about three miles of us in a village called Aldwalton or Atherton and the places thereabouts. They hearing of our preparations had left their quarters about Howley and chosen that place of advantage being both a great hill and an open moor or common, where our foot could not be able to stand their horse ... Upon Atherton moor they planted their ordnance and ordered their battalia, but they manned divers houses standing in the enclosed grounds betwixt Bradford and Atherton moor with musketeers, and sent out great parties of horse and foot by the lanes and enclosed grounds to give us fight ... Our forlorn hope beat back the enemies out of the lanes and enclosed grounds, killing many and taking some prisoners, and then the van coming up fell upon the enemies on the left hand and the main battle upon those on the right hand, and after some dispute beat the enemy both out of the houses they had manned and from the skirts of the moor to the height, killing very many and amongst them two Colonels ... and our horse very bravely recovered part of the moor from the enemy, and maintained it and the rear fell on in the middle and did good service. Thus far we had a fair day, but the success of our men at the first drew them unawares to engage themselves too far upon the enemies, who having the advantage of the ground, and infinitely exceeded us in numbers ... they sent some regiments of horse and foot by a lane on the left hand to encompass our army, and fall on our rear, which forced us to retreat, and our men, being unacquainted with field service, would not be drawn off in any order, but instead of marching fell into running...

Compare this with the account given by Sir Thomas Fairfax in his *Short Memorial*. After some delays, to which he imputed a treacherous motive, the Parliamentary army marched the three miles out of Bradford to meet the Royalists. But the late start meant 'when we were near the place we intended, the enemy's whole Army was drawn up in Battalia.'

We were to go up a Hill to them [Westgate Hill], which our Forlorn Hope gained by beating theirs into their own body, which was drawn up half a mile further up, on a place called Adderton Moor. We being all up the Hill drew into Battalia also. I commanded the right wing with about a 1000 Foot, and 5 Troops of Horse. Major General Gifford the left wing, which was about the same number. My father commanded all in chief. We advanced through the enclosed Grounds till we came to the Moor, beating the Foot that laid in them, to their main body. Ten or 12 Troops of Horse charged us in the right wing. We kept the enclosure, placing our musketeers in the hedges next the Moor, which was a good advantage to us who had so few

Horse. There was a Gate, or open place to the Moor, where five or six might enter in a breast. Here they strove to enter, and we to defend; but after some Dispute, those that entered the pass found sharp entertainment, and those that were not yet entered, as hot welcome from the Musketeers that flanked them in the hedges. All, in the end, were forced to retreat with the loss of our Colonel Howard, who commanded them. The left wing, at the same time, was engaged with the enemy's foot. We gained ground of them. The Horse came down again and charged us, being about 13 or 14 Troops. We defended our selves as before, but with much more difficulty, many having gotten in among us, but were beaten off again with loss and Colonel Herne, who commanded that party was slain. We pursued them to their cannon.

This charge, and the resolution that our soldiers shewed in the left wing, made the enemy think of retreating. Orders were given for it, and some marched off the field. While they were in this wavering condition, one Colonel Skirton [*?Kirton*], a wild and desperate man, desired his General to let him charge once more, with a stand of pikes with which he broke in upon our men and they not [being] relieved by our Reserves ... our men lost ground; which the enemy seeing, pursued the advantage by bringing on fresh Troops. Ours being herewith discouraged began to flee, and so were soon routed. The Horse also charged us again. We not knowing what was done in the left wing, our men maintained their ground till a command came for us to retreat having scarce any way now to do it, the enemy being almost round about it, and our way to Bradford cut off. But there was a lane in the field we were in which led to Halifax, which, as a happy providence, brought us off without any great loss..⁴

Other minor Parliamentary accounts, such as that by Captain John Hodgson, agree that Fairfax's army was initially successful: 'but the matter changed in a trice, and a party of their horse coming on, our party retreated and never again faced that day'.⁵

What can be deduced from these accounts? The Parliamentarians advanced three miles from Bradford and expelled the Royalist forlorn hope from Westgate Hill. Here the Parliamentarians formed up: Westgate Hill was their start line. According to Sir Thomas Fairfax the Royalists were in order of battle on Adwalton Moor half a mile beyond, which on today's map would place them on the rising ground just to the west of the copse of trees marked 'The Plantation'. To get to grips with the Royalists on the Moor Fairfax writes that the Parliamentarians had to advance across enclosed ground, flushing out enemy infantry as they did so. Then, having reached the edge of the Moor, his men halted and proceeded to beat off successive Royalist counterattacks from the safety of the last of the enclosures.

At this point Fairfax is writing about the exploits of his wing of the Parliamentary army only. Stockdale's account must be employed to discover what is happening elsewhere on the battlefield. Stockdale confirms that the Royalists were ordered on Adwalton Moor. But unlike Fairfax, who makes a clear distinction between the capture of Westgate Hill and the enclosed grounds beyond it, Stockdale mentions only that the Parliamentary forlorn hope beat out the enemy musketeers from the enclosed ground and houses 'betwixt Bradford and Atherton moor'. After that the Parliamentary main forces became engaged, cleared the remainder of the houses and pushed the Royalists back 'from the skirts of the moor to the height'. When Stockdale writes that the Parliamentary cavalry bravely recovered [i.e. captured] part of the moor he probably refers to Sir Thomas Fairfax's pursuit of the enemy to their cannon following the second Royalist repulse on that flank, although Fairfax does not claim to have held the ground as Stockdale suggests was the case. But what is clear is that in the centre and on the left the Parliamentarians pushed on too far and forfeited the cover of the enclosures. Stockdale claims that they reached at least the foot of Adwalton Hill itself, which means, if such were the case, that the Parliamentarians had made a fighting advance of well over a mile from Westgate Hill. At this point the initiative passed to the Royalists. Either, as Fairfax writes, a push of pike tipped the balance, or else, as

Stockdale claims, Royalist cavalry infiltrated round the parliamentary left flank into their rear.

The major sources for the Royalist view of the battle are the account in *An Express Relation of the Passages and Proceedings of his Majesty's Army, under the Command of... the Earl of Newcastle, against the Rebels under the command of the Lord Fairfax..*,⁶ and *The Life of William Cavendish, Duke of Newcastle... by Margaret Duchess of Newcastle*⁷. Although no author is given for the *Express Relation* it is written in the first person and is in the style of the Earl of Newcastle's other despatches. The Duchess's account is very similar in content.

The *Express Relation* explains how, early on 30 June 1643, Newcastle's army marched on Bradford from Howley Hall (now on the northern outskirts of Batley):

When we had marched two miles or thereabouts we found a great body of men, a greater number of foot than we, and almost all musketeers, and some 20 troops of horse, and had possessed a place called Adderton Moor, and had taken the most advantageous place thereof. They lined several places with musketeers, and played so fiercely upon us, and that before the whole body of our foot could be drawn up, and their horse likewise possessing a plain field and a great ditch betwixt us lined with musketeers, and keeping our horse in a ground full of pits, that for the space of two hours or thereabouts we were forced to give ground, though very little. But when our cannon was well placed, and our foot once drawn up, within half an hour we put their foot on the right wing of the battle to retire, and pursued them so hotly, that they were presently put into a disorderly retreat. Whereupon part of our horse fell upon that wing, and the cannon playing upon the body of their horse killed many and routed them, together with our horse charging at that time, so we pursued them, killing and taking them to Bradford town end, which was more than two miles⁸.

The Duchess's account of the battle is fuller:

...in their [the enemy's] army there were near 5000 musketeers, and 18 troops of horse, drawn up in a place full of hedges called Atherton moor, near to their garrison at Bradford, ready to encounter my lord's forces, which then contained not above half so many musketeers as the enemy had; their [the royalist] strength consisting in horse, and these made useless for a long time by the enemy's horse possessing all the plain ground upon that field; so that no place was left to draw up my lord's horse, but amongst old coal-pits. Neither could they charge the enemy by reason of a great ditch and high bank betwixt my lord's and the enemy's troops, but by two on a breast, and that within musket shot; the enemy being drawn up in hedges, and continually playing upon them, which rendered the service exceeding difficult and hazardous. In the meantime the foot on both sides on the right and left wings encountered each other, who fought from hedge to hedge and for a long time together overpowered and got ground of us, my lord's horse (wherein consisted his greatest strength) all this while being made, by reason of the ground, incapable of charging. At last the pikes of my lord's army having had no employment all the day, were drawn against the enemy's left wing, and particularly those of my lord's own regiment, which were all stout and valiant men, who fell so furiously upon the enemy, that they forsook the hedges, and fell to their heels. At which very instant my lord caused a shot or two to be made by his cannon against the body of the enemy's horse, drawn within cannon shot, which took so good effect, that it disordered the enemy's troops. Hereupon my lord's horse got over the hedge, not in a body (for that they could not do), but dispersedly two on a breast; and as soon as some considerable number was gotten over and

drawn up, they charged the enemy and routed them. So that in an instant there was a strange change of fortune and the field totally won by my lord...⁹

The interesting feature of these accounts is that they suggest that the Parliamentarians had the choosing of the ground for the battle. The Parliamentarian accounts, however, particularly Stockdale's, imply that the Royalists selected the ground. It would appear, therefore, that because neither side had intended to fight in this precise spot on Adwalton Moor, each believed that the other had arranged to enjoy the advantage of the ground. Sir Henry Slingsby, who fought on the Royalist side in the battle, recognised this.

It is resolved on both sides to give battle and yet neither knew of the other's intentions: they both draw out, his excellency [Newcastle] thinking to find him [Fairfax] within his fortifications; my lord Fairfax draws out, advancing towards the camp where his excellence lay. The forlorn hope of his excellence's army met unexpectedly with the van of the enemy.

The impression given that Slingsby was well-attuned to the nature of events is strengthened by his description of the battle that followed.

Our forlorn hope skirmish and are put to retreat. He [Newcastle] encourages his men and puts the enemy to a stand. They come on fiercer, and beat the enemy [the Royalists], from one hedge, from one house to another; at last they [the Royalists] were driven to retreat and we recover [i.e. fall back on] the moor: there the enemy had like to have gained our cannon; but was manfully defended by a stand of pikes; now the battle began to decline on the other part, so that their reserve was sent for. But seeing lieutenant-general King advance with all the horse that remained and wheeling about to get between the town and their forces, and also the colours advancing in a thick body up the hill, (for all their musketeers were drawn out to equal their shots), Stockdale stood at my Lord Fairfax's elbow, advised my lord not to hazard the rest seeing all was lost; but to shift for himself: so that they were totally routed..¹⁰

Slingsby's diary entry accords with the other narratives of the battle. The critical moment in the action was a push by a body of Royalist pikemen; the discomfiture of Lord Fairfax's forces was completed by Royalist cavalry getting around their left flank. All the contemporary writers admit that the Parliamentarians had the best of the battle until a sudden change of fortune occurred once they advanced onto the moor itself. But having established that, how exactly are all these accounts of the battle to be reconciled with the topography?

Sir Thomas Fairfax's *Short Memorial* placed the Royalists half a mile beyond Westgate Hill near the modern-day feature called 'The Plantation'. It is pointless trying to match the reference in the Earl of Newcastle's despatch to his army advancing two miles or thereabouts from Howley Hall before encountering the enemy to the terrain as the distance to Adwalton Moor is nearer three miles as the crow flies. However, the allusion of Newcastle and his wife to the Royalist cavalry being hampered by old coal-pits is most helpful. Although the modern ordnance survey map does not show the location of these pits they can be traced on one of its predecessors published in 1852. The major (relevant) concentration of pits is around 'The Plantation', then known as 'Pit Hole Plantation', with a few more nearer the lower slopes of Adwalton moorside. This then would appear to be the vicinity in which the Royalists were arrayed. Clearly, if it were such bad ground for cavalry, the Earl of Newcastle would not have chosen it if he could have found an alternative. Unfortunately, the unexpected issuing forth of the Parliamentarians caught him in mid-march and Newcastle had to take what was available. The ground ahead was too enclosed so he had to draw back his cavalry to be clear of the coal-pits as far as possible.

Newcastle's infantry was left to dispute the lanes and houses to the west (these probably serviced the coal pits) but because they were short of musketeers (Stockdale refers to the Royalists being 'very slenderly armed'; no doubt an effect of the Parliamentarians' seizure of the great arsenal in the north at Hull at the outbreak of war) they were unable to hold back their outnumbered opponents. If the Royalist cavalry were held back to avoid the worst of the coal-pits they would have been in line of battle approximately 700 yards west of Adwalton village.

The Parliamentarians meanwhile must have fought their way up to the line of 'The Plantation' and then continued advancing through more enclosures to close with the enemy. By this point Lord Fairfax's men would have been getting very close to the unenclosed area of Adwalton Moor as it was marked in the mid-nineteenth century and which is still recognisable as an area of open ground in the Adwalton of today. The unenclosed moorland would not have advanced since the seventeenth century, so it is safe to assume that once the Parliamentarians crossed the line of the present A58 they would have been about to break cover. The slopes of Adwalton Hill beckoned; once they were reached the Parliamentarians would, according to Stockdale, get little further.

Sir Thomas Fairfax, on the right flank, had been more circumspect. He kept the enclosures and made only one foray forward. According to Burne and Young in their analysis of the battle Sir Thomas's wing was located a little way down the slope from the ridge leading to Adwalton Moor - this is to accommodate his claim that at the end of the battle he could not see the retreat of his father's troops in the centre- and that in charging forward his men advanced 600 yards to Warren Lane. The latter figure is arrived at simply because it is 600 yards from Warren Lane to the position Burne and Young allot the Parliamentary line of battle, so no great store need be set on that. However, the reference to Warren Lane itself is more interesting. This is generally taken to be the 'lane in the field we were in' which Sir Thomas later used to draw his wing out of the battle once his retreat to Bradford was cut off. There are various printed copies of Sir Thomas's *Short Memorial* but the specific mention of the lane in question being Warren Lane, when included, is an editorial remark and not in the original text. This is not to deny that there was a Warren Lane leading off Hodgson Lane to Gomersal and Halifax in 1643, there was; it is rather a reminder that Sir Thomas's retreat along it is a possibility and not a stated fact.

However, if it is accepted that Warren Lane played a part in the battle (and it is difficult to envisage to which other lane Sir Thomas could have been referring), it serves as further confirmation of the high water mark of the Parliamentary advance, since Warren Lane approaches Adwalton Moor near the beginning of the incline leading to the summit. That is encouraging. But what of the reference in the accounts of the battle by Newcastle and his wife to the great ditch that lay between the two armies? Where might that have existed? Assuming that it has not disappeared altogether, when looking at the map today one's eye is drawn towards Inmoor Dike. But the dyke is rather too close to Westgate Hill to have been called into play in the main battle. Instead, the watercourse marked on the Ordnance Survey map just to the east of The Plantation, in its own shallow depression, is a more likely candidate: 250 years ago it might have proved an obstacle.

There are a few other references which require linking to the terrain. The lane on the Royalist right along which their cavalry advanced to outflank the enemy and so precipitate their rout would presumably be the present A650, then as now the Bradford to Wakefield road. The 'hill' up which Sir Henry Slingsby saw the Royalist colours advance 'in a thick body' at the climax of the battle was not the reverse slope of Adwalton Moortop (if the Royalists had been driven off that the battle would have been long over) but the slope back up to the high ground around The Plantation which the Parliamentarians had occupied earlier.

Indication of Importance

With the exception of Marston Moor the following year Adwalton Moor was the most important battle fought north of the Trent during the First Civil War. The battle gave control of the north to the Royalists and presented the Earl of Newcastle with the opportunity to threaten the Parliamentary heartland of the Eastern Association.

Adwalton Moor is a reasonably well-documented battle. Accounts of the fighting survive from both the Parliamentary and Royalist viewpoints. The course of events is easy to reconstruct and, with the help of the original Ordnance Survey map of the area, can be matched to features of the terrain mentioned by participants.

Although about half the battlefield is today built over the site has not been altogether spoilt. The unenclosed area marked on the Ordnance Survey map of 1847 as 'Adwalton Moor' is still remarkably intact. It is fortunate that this important part of the battlefield upon which the Parliamentary advance was halted remains open ground. Similarly, the eastern approaches of Westgate Hill are still open between Hodgson Lane and the Bradford to Wakefield road, as is The Plantation, where a series of small ponds pinpoint the location of the old coal pits.

Battlefield Area Description

The battlefield area boundary defines the outer reasonable limit of the battle, taking into account the positions of the combatants at the outset of fighting and the focal area of the battle itself. It does not include areas over which fighting took place subsequent to the main battle. Wherever possible, the boundary has been drawn so that it is easily appreciated on the ground.

The Parliamentary start line on Westgate Hill is the western limit of the battlefield area: this can be taken to be the road to Birkenshaw from Cross Lane End. To the south, Hodgson Lane at first appears to make a convenient boundary. Hodgson Lane is an historic Lane and, according to one local writer, derives its name from Captain John Hodgson of Coley Hall who fought at the battle¹¹. However, there is flat ground beyond it which Sir Thomas Fairfax's wing would have had to guard during the battle. Burne and Young place Sir Thomas's flank further south still a little down the slope near Upper Sunny Bank; but the southern slope of the ridge leading to Adwalton Moor is quite steep and it is unlikely that the Parliamentarians would over-extend their line to occupy such unprofitable ground. Accordingly, the battlefield boundary should be drawn from the Cross Lane End - Birkenshaw road via Springfield Farm and Hill Top Farm to Upper Sunny Bank.

The battlefield area turns north-eastwards at Upper Sunny Bank. For illustrative purposes, however, the full extent of the fighting has been represented by a dashed line continuing south-eastwards past Heightlands Farm as far as the Railway Tavern (National Grid reference SE222281) before turning northwards through modern Drighlington. The dashed line illustrates the extent of the Parliamentarians' furthest advance, roughly speaking the road from old Adwalton village to the Railway Inn. It might be thought strange that the battlefield area does not include the summit of Adwalton Moor but it is unlikely the Parliamentarians got particularly close to it.

To the north it is not easy to draw a visible boundary beyond the A650. Room must be allowed for the Royalist cavalry to perform its outflanking manoeuvre on the Parliamentary Left, so the battlefield area includes land to the north of the road at Tong Lane End. For illustrative purposes, the full extent of the ground used in the manoeuvre is represented by a dashed line, but the battlefield area skirts the built-up area on its southern side to meet the A58 road and thence to Upper Sunny Bank to complete the circuit.

Notes

1. Martyn Bennett's *Traveller's Guide to the Battlefields of the English Civil War* (Exeter 1990) is the recent exception. A brief account of the battle is given on pages 62-64.
2. Printed in *Stuart Tracts 1603-1693* intro. by C H Firth (New York 1964).
3. Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts 13th Report, Appendix, Part 1. The Manuscripts of His Grace The Duke of Portland, preserved at Welbeck Abbey vol. 1 (London 1891) pp719-20.
4. *Stuart Tracts* pp379-81.
5. *Autobiography of Captain John Hodgson of Coley Hall, near Halifax* ed. J Ritson, additional notes by J H Turner (Brighouse 1882) p25.
6. *The Life of William Cavendish, Duke of Newcastle. To Which is Added the True Relation of My Birth Breeding and Life, by Margaret Duchess of Newcastle* ed. C H Firth (2nd edn. London 1907).
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.* pp215-6.
9. *Ibid.* pp24-5.
10. *The Diary of Sir Henry Slingsby of Scriven, Bart.* ed. Rev. Daniel Parsons (London 1836) pp96-7.
11. Parker, James *Illustrated Rambles from Hipperholme to Tong* (Bradford 1904) pp297, 299.