

English Heritage Battlefield Report: Winceby 1643

Winceby (11 October 1643)

Parishes: Mareham on the Hill, Lusby with Winceby, Greetham with Somersby, Hameringham

District: East Lindsey

County: Lincolnshire

Grid Ref: TF 313687

Historical Context

The Royalist High Command hoped that the Earl of Newcastle, following his victory at Adwalton Moor in June 1643, would be in a position to advance from Yorkshire and threaten the Parliamentary stronghold of the Eastern Association (East Anglia). Newcastle's 15,000 strong army constituted the third arm of a three pronged Royalist offensive intended to isolate and finally reduce the main centre of Parliamentary resistance, London.

Unfortunately, by September, the Earl of Newcastle had allowed most of his army to become bogged down in a siege of Hull, where his antagonists, the Fairfaxes, had retreated after their defeat at Adwalton Moor. Although the garrison were sustained from across the River Humber, the Royalists failed to act with sufficient decision to secure Lincolnshire and close the line of supply. Instead, the Earl of Manchester, commander of the army of the Eastern Association, went onto the attack, advancing into Lincolnshire from Norfolk. He was joined at Boston by the cavalry of Oliver Cromwell and Sir Thomas Fairfax.

The Royalists knew that with the Earl of Manchester at Boston, their garrison at Bolingbroke Castle, fifteen miles to the north, would come under threat. Newcastle therefore ordered Sir William Widdrington, the senior Royalist in the county, to march to the garrison's aid. A small army of 2,500-3,000 cavalry and dragoons was gathered together at Lincoln, whereupon it rode to Horncastle, 20 miles to the east. Here, on 10 October, the Royalists encountered elements of the Parliamentarian cavalry screen, engaged in covering the siege of Bolingbroke Castle, which lay seven miles to the southeast. The Parliamentarian horse were driven off. Next day the Royalists moved out of Horncastle and continued towards Bolingbroke Castle, only to meet midway, near the hamlet of Winceby, the Earl of Manchester's army, advancing to intercept them.

Location and Description of the Battlefield

Between Horncastle and Spilsby, ten miles to the east, lies the southern edge of the Lincolnshire Wolds. It was among these grassy uplands that the Battle of Winceby was fought. Fairfax himself establishes that the battle was at Winceby:

Presently the Bodies met in the plain where the Fight was hot for half an hour, but then we forced them to a rout. Above 200 killed, and 200 taken prisoners. This was the issue of Horncastle (or as some call it Winceby) Fight¹.

The hamlet of Winceby itself sits on a ridge, reaching an average height of approximately 350-400 feet. To the north and east the ground falls away rapidly into a steep-sided hollow, Snipe Dales. To the south-west the ground falls away towards the village of Hameringham in a more gradual fashion.

The ridge runs south-east two miles from Winceby beyond Asgarby before descending steeply towards Old Bolingbroke (and Bolingbroke Castle), which sits at the bottom of a second dale. It was along this route that the

Earl of Manchester advanced. To the north-west, the direction from which the Royalists approached the battlefield, the Winceby ridge achieves its highest point (425 feet) at Round Hills Holt, where the A1115 from Winceby joins the A158(T) Horncastle road. Before reaching this junction, however, the A1115 must negotiate a 30 foot dip caused by the North Beck draining off towards Hameringham and the south-west. This slope played an important part in the Battle of Winceby, hence the appellation by which it is known today - Slash Hollow.

Landscape Evolution

The major part of the battlefield area was sheep pasture in 1643, but with cultivation near the hamlet⁺. The present A1115 Winceby to Lusby road follows its former line through Winceby but deviates northwards to join the A158 at Round Hills Holt. The earliest Ordnance Survey map shows the old road to continue north-westwards along what is now a footpath.

Evidence of substantial ancient hedgerows survive along parts of the parish boundary. Slash Hollow could have been boggy in October, helping to mire Royalist cavalry trapped against a parish boundary hedge the line of which is still preserved in part by an appreciable ditch. There is also an old hedgebank partly preserved in Westmoor Plantation which may have marked a further stretch of parish boundary.

Map evidence for subsequent landscape change is scanty, although the Tithe Apportionment records a mostly arable landscape in the 1830s. The area had been enclosed, privately rather than by Parliamentary Act, before 1839. Various blocks of trees, especially Westmoor Plantation which has been coppiced in the past, have been planted over the last 200 years in the valleys.

In 1860 St Margarets Church was built at Winceby but was demolished in 1964. There is evidence of an earlier thatched church which would have formed a feature in 1643. Winceby today consists of little more than a handful of houses and is unlikely to have amounted to much more in the seventeenth century. The largest building in the hamlet, Winceby House Farm, is Georgian in style.

The Sources

The sources for the Battle of Winceby consist mainly of pamphlets, the majority written by ostensible eyewitnesses. The two sides' commanders also wrote reports. In addition, Sir Thomas Fairfax, who led the Parliamentarian cavalry reserve into battle, recalled the action in his *Short Memorial of the Northern Actions*:

The day following we advanced again toward the enemy, and choosing a convenient ground to fight upon we drew up the Army there. The enemy did so, on the side of another hill close by, having a little place between us. Lieut. Genl. Cromwell had the van, I the Reserve of Horse, my Lord Manchester all the Foot. After we had faced one another a little while the Forlorn Hopes began the Fight. Presently the Bodies met in the plain where the Fight was hot for half an hour, but then we forced them to a rout. Above 200 killed, and 200 taken prisoners. This was the issue of Horncastle (or as some call it Winceby) Fight¹.

Fairfax establishes that the battle was at Winceby. The Parliamentarians chose the ground, placing themselves, so we infer, on a hillside; the enemy drew up 'on the side of *another* hill close by'. There was only a 'little place' between the two armies. The little that we are told about the terrain is consistent with the location of the battle on the Ordnance Survey map. The Royalists were marshalled on the hillside south of Round Hills Holt; the Parliamentarians on the spur of the ridge west of Winceby. Between them is the declivity created by the North Beck.

⁺ The assistance of David Robinson is gratefully acknowledged, although this does not imply that he necessarily concurs with the interpretations herein.

The Earl of Manchester's letter to Parliament written the day after the battle reported his success:

Upon Wednesday last, being the 11th of October, I drew up the whole Body of Horse and Foot before the Castle of Bullingbrooke, having had the Night before, through some neglect of the Yorkshire Horse, who kept the Out Guards, some of our Horse put to run a great hazard [at Horncastle]; yet they behaved themselves very well, and got off with the Loss of One Colour. After I was drawn into a Body, Word was brought me, that the Enemy was advancing towards me, with Eighty Colours of Horse: Upon this intelligence, I thought it my Duty not to quit the Place where I was, unless it were by marching to meet him, which I did; and, when my Horse were drawn into as good Order as we could put them, the Enemy was drawn very near to the Horse: The Foot and Artillery marched up as fast as they could after the Horse, but came not so near as to give any Help; only they did dishearten the Enemy much, by the Confession of the Prisoners which we took, and made them charge the Horse sooner and more confusedly than otherwise they would have done. I must give the Horse under my Command their due Praise, that they charged very gallantly. Colonel Cromwell charged in the Van with my Regiment and his own, and behaved himself with Resolution and Honour. Sir Tho. Fairefaix (who is a Person that exceeds any Expression as a commendation of his Resolution and Valour) was to Second the First Body of Horse that charged; and he performed what he was commanded with Readiness and Success. I may truly say, that, after the Second Charge, our Men had little else to do but to pursue a flying Enemy, which they did for many Miles. What Loss the Enemy had, truly, as yet I cannot punctually speak; only this I can say, divers Men of Quality lay dead upon the Place, and divers that rode away fell dead from off their Horses in the Towns some Miles off from the Place where we fought. I have sent Eight Hundred Prisoners to Boston. There were killed upon the Place about Three Hundred, as we can guess².

Manchester advanced to meet the enemy from Old Bolingbroke. His cavalry was some way forward of the supporting infantry and artillery. The Earl implies that he had the choosing of the ground: by the time 'the Enemy was drawn very near', 'my Horse were drawn into as good Order as we could put them'. The reference to the proximity of the Royalist army bears out Fairfax's observation that there was only a 'little place' between the two sides. Manchester agrees with Fairfax that Cromwell led the first line and Sir Thomas the second. Two charges were sufficient to secure victory.

A third Parliamentary perspective on the events of the Battle of Winceby is furnished by the pamphlet *A True and Exact Relation of the great Victorys obtained by the Earl of Manchester, and the Lord Fairfax* (dated 19 October 1643):

The Earl spent all that night in the field for the better drawing up of his body together against the next morning, when having intelligence that the enemy would march next day to Bullingbroke for the relief of the castle, the Earl, the next morning, being Wednesday the 12th of October, drew all his horse and foot into battalions upon Bullingbrooke Hill, having a very safe place of retreat into Holland. About twelve of the clock, notice was brought that the enemy was marching within three miles on a full body, whereupon the Earl marched towards them and met them midway upon a plain field, near where the armies faced one another about one hour, and then the forlorn hope had a very sharp encounter, and my Lord Manchester's regiment and Colonel Cromwell's gave their body such a charge as they would not abide a second.

Colonel Cromwell charged at some distance before his regiment, when his horse was killed under him. He recovered himself, however, from under his horse but afterwards was again knocked down, yet by God's good providence he got up again. The enemy's forlorn hope charging ours, and a good body of horse following them, Sir Thomas Fairfax being in the rear of Colonel Cromwell's regiment with his first body, fell in towards the flank of the enemy's body, and so Sir Thomas

had the chase and execution of them a great way. Sir Miles Hubbard's regiments were ready to charge, and the enemy turning head, our men fell upon them and pursued them four miles, killing many and taking prisoners all the way.

Colonel Carnaby, Colonel Hopton, and divers persons of great quality were slain, whereof many fell in the place of encounter. 1200 were slain, wounded, and taken prisoners, and as the countrymen report, betwixt 100 and 200 drowned in Horncastle river. The Earl pursued the enemy to Horncastle and there quartered for the night. Very many of our men are wounded, but we do not hear of above twenty killed³.

The pamphlet's author states that the Earl of Manchester gathered his army on 'Bullingbrooke Hill', heard that the enemy were three miles away and marched against them in the early afternoon. If the evidence presented is to be taken literally Manchester confronted his opponents midway, i.e. one and a half miles, from Bolingbroke Hill. This would place the battlefield on the ridge just to the south-east of Winceby, near the junction of the Asgarby road with the A1115 to Lusby. Nearly a mile separates it from the previously suggested field of battle.

Other than this the greatest contribution of the *True and Exact Relation* is to shed light on the course of the battle. Once again we read that, after a clash of the Forlorn Hopes, Cromwell led the vanguard into action. His charge was powerful, but in the course of it he was unhorsed. Sir Thomas Fairfax, in the second line, then led the cavalry reserve in a flank attack and chased the Royalists from the field. Fairfax's intervention presumably occasioned the encomiums heaped on his conduct when the Earl of Manchester came to write his report on the battle.

Another Parliamentary pamphlet to deal with Winceby (although it mistakes the name) was *A True Relation of the Late Fight Betweene the Right Honourable The Earle of Manchester's Forces, and the Marquesse of Newcastle's Forces*:

The next morning being Wednesday my Lord gave order that the whole force both Horse and Foote should be drawn up to Bolenbrooke hill, where he would expect the enemy, being the only convenient ground to fight with him. Colonell Cromwell was no way satisfied that we should fight, our Horse being extreame wearied with hard duty two or three dayes together.

The enemy drew that morning their whole body of horse and Dragooneers into the field, being 74 Colours of horse, and 21 Colours of Dragooneers, in all 95 Colours. We had not many more than halfe so many Colours of horse & Dragooneers, but I believe we had as many men, besides our foot, which indeed could not be drawne up untill it was very late. I beleieve that as we had no notice of the enemies comming towards us, so they had as little of our preparation to fight with them. It was about twelve a clocke, ere our horse and Dragooneers were drawne up, after that we marched about a mile nearer the enemy, and then we began to descry him by little and little comming towards us; untill this time we did not know we should fight, but so soone as our men had knowledge of the enemies comming they were very full of joy and resolution, thinking it a great mercy that they should fight with him. Our men went on in severall bodies singing Psalmes, Quartermaster Generall Vermayden with five troopes had the forlorne hope, and Colonell Cromwell the Vanne, assisted with other of my Lords troopes, and seconded by Sir Thomas Faifax; both armies met about Ixby (if I mistake not the Townes name) both they and we had drawne up our Dragooneers, who gave the first charge, and then the horse fell in. Colonell Cromwell fell with resolution upon the enemy, immediately after their Dragooneers had given him the first volley, yet they were so nimble, as within halfe Pistoll shot they gave him another: his horse was killed under him at the first charge, and felle downe upon him, as he rose he was knock'd downe againe by the Gentleman that charged him, who we conceive was Sir Ingram Hopton; but afterward he recovered a poore horse in a Souldiers hand and mounted himselfe againe. Truly this charge was so home given that the enemy stood not another but were driven backe upon their owne body that was to second them, and put them into disorder, our men

charged all in with him, and then they ran for it, leaving all their Dragooneers which were now on foot behind them. Our men pursued them, and did execution on them about five miles, all the way being strewd with broken armes, dead men and horses ... we doe not agree upon the number of the slaine, I guess them under one thousand; the fight continued not above a quarter of an houre, but the execution untill almost night ... we lost very few, none of note ... The foote were not drawne up to the place where the fight was, untill after the fight and chase was over ... my Lord [Manchester] tooke wonderfull paines in bringing it to this passe; and drawing up all the foote to have relieved the horse, in case they had needed it. But God did all, taking away the enemies hearts...⁴

In this account the Parliamentary cavalry and Dragoons are again drawn up on Bolingbroke Hill, and once again march out in the early afternoon. The Parliamentary mounted troops are estimated to have been of equal strength to their Royalist counterparts; the Parliamentary Foot, who gave their side its numerical superiority, did not come up until the battle was over. After they had ridden a mile the Parliamentarians caught first sight of their foe: if they had drawn up on what is now Horncastle Hill, above Old Bolingbroke to the west, Winceby would indeed come into view once they passed Asgarby, a mile along the road. The copses of trees on the fringes of Winceby obscure the view beyond the hamlet, but whether the Parliamentarians, in view of the ridge's configuration, could have caught sight of the Royalists any further away is doubtful.

The remainder of the pamphlet's account confirms the Parliamentarians' order of battle. We learn more about the danger Cromwell was in. Once victory was achieved the pursuit was relentless.

Sir William Widdrington, the Royalist commander, penned a report on Winceby for the Earl of Newcastle. The despatch, written the day of the battle, was intercepted by the Parliamentarians:

I thought fit to give your Lordship an Account of our Business yesterday, how bad soever, as speedily as I could. We had but three Divisions charged, two Divisions being of Sir William Savill's, the third of my Lord Ething's and Sir John Henderson's joyned, being eight Troops. The third Division, being of the Left Wing, put the Enemy to Disorder: But Savill's Regiment totally running, disordered and so put to Rout our whole Army. We have in a manner totally lost our Foot and Dragoons that were there, being near 800 Horse, extremely dispersed, but no great number cut off ... Their Horse are very good, and extraordinarily armed; and may be reported to be betwixt 50 and 60 Troops, being very strong. I do not know the number of their Foot; but we believe them to be about 1500, or betwixt that and 2,000. Their Foot was not come up to their Horse; and the Ground they had chosen would not admit of above three Divisions of Horse to charge at once. They are at present at Liberty to dispose of their Forces what way they please, either to Hull or Derby ...*[Postscript]* Sir Ingram Hopton certainly is slain, and Captain Abraham Marcham, and Sir George Bowes ... He that commanded that division that routed Savills first division (being conceived to be Cromwell) is certainly slain, and one or two officers more...⁵

Of greatest interest is Widdrington's reference to the Royalists' narrow front: the Parliamentarians' choice of ground allowed only three divisions to charge at once. The third division, we are told, consisted of eight troops, some 480 men. Since Royalist cavalry tended to attack three deep, and allowing five feet for each horse, this suggests that the third division had a frontage of 270 yards. The three divisions together - up to 1,500 men (a reasonable first line when the entire force was estimated at 2,500-3,000 men) - would have extended between 800-900 yards. The Parliamentarians themselves clearly had a similar frontage: their number of cavalry was considered equal, and the cavalry were drawn up in two lines (under Cromwell and Fairfax)⁶.

Finally, for the week 13 - 20 October 1643, *The Parliament Scout: Communicating His Intelligence to the Kingdome*, printed a letter from a member of the Earl of Manchester's army at Winceby. It is unnecessary to quote from the letter at length as parts of the account are confused, particularly the writer's belief that Manchester set out from Old Bolingbroke for Boston, feigning retreat. However, the writer confirms that Manchester's army 'consisted

of about three thousand horse, and two thousand foote', which is as expected. The Royalists are also referred to as being on a hill ('but seeing my Lord still upon a seeming retreat, left the hill, and came to equall ground'), which echoes Sir Thomas Fairfax's memoir of the battle.

Cromwell having been given command of the cavalry, Manchester 'came after with the foote, about half a mile distant'. In the fight that followed Cromwell was unhorsed but within half an hour the Royalists were beaten: 'our Musketeers never came up, though so neere, the enemy fled sundrie wayes, they were pursued many miles. Sir Thomas Fairefax did bravely in the Chase, but was not come in untill they were routed'⁷.

The Battle

In determining exactly where the battle was fought the balance of opinion has favoured a location north-west of Winceby. As indicated, this is where the battlefield is marked on the Ordnance Survey map. Sir Thomas Fairfax's description of the battlefield matches the location. The Parliamentarians - as the Earl of Manchester implied and Sir William Widdrington confirmed - chose the ground and the Royalists were left with only a narrow front on which to deploy. This the ground south of Round Hills Holt provides, above the dry valley with the head of Snipe Dales and the marsh of Slash Hollow confining movements to north-east and south-west.

There is also the fact that the road west of Winceby and south of Round Hills Holt is known as Slash Lane, with Slash Hollow to the south-west. Here the Royalist cavalry is held to have suffered most severely. A gate is supposed to have barred the way from the battlefield, and because it opened inwards many of the fleeing Royalists were trapped and slaughtered. True, none of this is mentioned in contemporary accounts of the battle, but it is lent weight by tradition. Clements Markham noted the tradition when he visited Winceby to research his book *The Great Lord Fairfax* (1870)⁸. He took an especial interest in the Battle of Winceby because an ancestor of his, a Colonel Markham, was killed there. Many years later Colonels Alfred Burne and Peter Young, in their book *The Great Civil War*⁹, elaborated on the story about the gate that opened the wrong way. They marked on a plan of the battlefield the hedgerow which divided the parishes in which the gate was set. Although no evidence for the hedge's existence in 1643 was given, a look at the first 1: 2,500 Ordnance Survey map for Winceby confirms that a hedge marked the parish boundary for much of its way across Slash Hollow in 1888.

David Robinson, in his *Book of Horncastle and Woodhall Spa*¹⁰, however, disputes this location for the gate. Pointing to the practice of gating through roads at parish boundaries, he concludes that the gate must have been across the former road between Winceby and Horncastle near the point where it now changes direction northwards. Back whence they had come would have been the natural direction of flight for the defeated Royalists. Finding their route soon congested if not actually blocked, the panicked troops fled downhill into Slash Hollow where 'the blood ran down horse fetlock deep' from the carnage.

Clements Markham, however, did not allude to the traditions about Slash Lane/Hollow in order to suggest that the battle took place in its vicinity. As far as he was concerned the slaughter occurred there during the pursuit. The battle itself was fought south-east of Winceby where the roads to Lusby and Old Bolingbroke separate. Markham's justification for believing this appears to centre on the discovery of seven bodies some time before he visited in a field called Lusby Walk. The 1888 Ordnance Survey map confirms that human remains were found in an old stone pit north of the Lusby road.

As seen already, the pamphlet *A True and Exact Relation* appeared to indicate that the battle was fought in pretty much the same place. The ridge is certainly narrow at this point and so would justify Widdrington's complaint about the narrow frontage. However, against this the discovery of bodies does not necessarily prove anything. Wounded men could have been carried to the rear. A stone pit dug elsewhere could equally well have uncovered bodies; human remains presumably litter Slash Hollow. Most tellingly, the reference to hills at Winceby does not sit so easily with this 'battlefield' as it does with one to the north-west of the hamlet.

The most rigorous attempt to match accounts of Winceby with the terrain of the battlefield is probably that made by Colonels Burne and Young¹¹. In particular, they endeavour to explain the manoeuvre performed by Sir Thomas Fairfax when he launched his flank attack. The Forlorn Hopes of the two armies, consisting of dragoons, had begun the battle. The Royalist and Parliamentary first lines then advanced into the dip between the two hills on which they were drawn up. They were soon locked in combat. It was then that Fairfax with the Parliamentary second line moved against the Royalist flank. Burne and Young postulate that he attacked the Royalist left, moving along the level ground towards what is now Winceby High Barn before sweeping down into the dip. The layout of the terrain, which Burne and Young appositely liken to a horseshoe lying on its side, the ground falling away in the middle towards one side, was conducive to the manoeuvre's execution. What is more, the angle of Fairfax's attack explains why much of the Royalist cavalry was driven south-westwards further into Slash Hollow once barred from their natural line of retreat to Horncastle.

It is an attractive reconstruction, one followed by John Kinross in his *Discovering Battlefields in Northern England and Scotland* (Tring 1968). Initially it may seem not to work because the flank Fairfax is supposed to have attacked on is the one on which Sir William Widdrington states that the Royalists enjoyed their greatest success - the left. Sir William Savill's divisions, which Burne and Young envisage as scattering before Fairfax's onslaught, were actually broken on the far flank. To allow for this objection Philip Warner, writing the Winceby chapter in his book on British Battles, has Sir Thomas Fairfax move to his left and rout Savill *south* of Winceby¹².

But the re-interpretation need not be this radical. The difficulty stems from Burne and Young's attempt, reacting against what they feel is the undue prominence afforded Cromwell's part in the battle, to transfer the chief credit to Fairfax. Fairfax, therefore, is given the decisive role. Reading the contemporary accounts of the battle, however, it is clear that it was Cromwell's first charge which did most of the damage and that Fairfax's intervention merely served to clear the field. Two charges secured victory, as the Earl of Manchester wrote. But the pamphlet accounts elaborate upon what is meant by this. *A True and Exact Relation* stated that 'my Lord Manchester's regiment and Colonel Cromwell's gave their body such a charge as they would not abide a second'; Fairfax's flank attack simply ensured that 'Sir Thomas had the chase and execution of them a great way'. *A True Relation* adjudged that Cromwell's charge 'was so home given that the enemy stood not another but were driven backe upon their owne body that was to second them, and put them into disorder', whereupon 'our men charged all in with him [i.e. the Parliamentary reserves joined the fray], and then they ranne for it'. The *Parliament Scout* states explicitly that 'Sir Thomas Fairfax did bravely in the Chase, but was not come in untill they were routed'. Even Widdrington referred to 'He that commanded that division that routed Savills first division (being conceived to be Cromwell)'.

Matters become clear. Sir Thomas Fairfax attacked the Royalist left flank and concluded the battle; but, by beating Savill on the other side of the field, Cromwell's first line had already done most of the work.

Indication of Importance

The same day as the Royalist reverse at Winceby, Sir Thomas Fairfax's father, Lord Fairfax, compelled the Earl of Newcastle to raise the siege of Hull. Any prospect of Newcastle resuming his drive on London evaporated, as Sir Thomas recognised: 'These 2 defeats together (the one falling heavy upon the Horse, the other upon the Foot) kept the enemy all winter from attempting anything'¹³. Winceby was of strategic importance.

The battle consolidated the reputation of the Eastern Association cavalry, in particular Cromwell's own regiment, after their success at Gainsborough in July. These were the men who the following year would sweep aside Prince Rupert's previously invincible cavalry at Marston Moor. Winceby is also notable as the first occasion on which Parliament's two best soldiers - Sir Thomas Fairfax and Oliver Cromwell - fought side by side.

Battlefield Area

The battlefield area boundary defines the outer reasonable limit of the battle, taking into account the positions of the combatants at the outset of fighting and the focal area of the battle itself. It does not include areas over which

fighting took place subsequent to the main battle. Wherever possible, the boundary has been drawn so that it is easily appreciated on the ground, although in a landscape as open as at Winceby, this has not always been possible.

Beginning at the southern extreme by the mast at the top of the track leading to Westmoor Cottage (now demolished) the line of the battlefield area follows the parish boundary to and through the Westmoor Plantation. This has been identified as the line of the hedge which prevented the fleeing Royalists' escape from Slash Hollow once blocked by the gate which opened the wrong way. The battlefield line then diverges from the parish boundary and heads northwards from the Westmoor Plantation as far as the junction of the A158(T) with Long Hedge Lane: this ensures that the crest of the slope on which the Royalist right wing deployed is included in the battlefield area.

By following the A158(T) eastward the battlefield boundary incorporates the forward slope of Round Hills Holt, where the Royalist left was drawn up. The boundary cuts south-east to the track to Winceby High Barn before skirting the edge of Snipe Dales. The Dales delimit the eastern edge of the battlefield, making evident the ground over which Fairfax performed his flanking manoeuvre. From south of Isaac's Holt the battlefield boundary follows a short track to the A1115 and then traces a line south-westwards across a field back to the mast to complete the circuit. In this way the spur of the ridge west of Winceby upon which Cromwell and Fairfax were positioned is incorporated in the battlefield area.

The location of the Parliamentary infantry, which failed to arrive in time to take part in the fighting, is excluded from the battlefield area. Only the nearest part of the closing slaughter is included in the battlefield area. The documentary sources indicate unequivocally that the pursuit continued for several miles.

Notes

1. Fairfax, Sir Thomas 'A Short Memorial of Northern Actions during the War there, from the Year 1642 till 1644'. *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* v (1926) p167.
2. *Journals of the House of Lords* vi 255.
3. Thomason Tract E.71(22) in the British Library, London.
4. Thomason Tract E.71(5) in the British Library, London.
5. Printed in John Rushworth's *Historical Collections* (London 1721) v 282.
6. Contemporary cavalry tactics are discussed in *The Young Horse-man, or The honest plain-dealing Cavalier* by John Vernon (London 1644). The 1993 Partizan Press edition is edited by John Tincey.
7. Thomason Tract E.71 (25) in the British Library, London.
8. Markham, Clements R. *A Life of the Great Lord Fairfax* (London 1870) pp120-1.
9. Lt-Col. A H Burne & Lt-Col. Peter Young *The Great Civil War: A Military History of the First Civil War 1642-1646* (London 1959) pp113-115.
10. Robinson, D.N. *The Book of Horncastle and Woodhall Spa* (1983).
11. *Ibid.* pp111-118.
12. Warner, Philip *British Battlefields: The North* (Reading 1972) p85 (map between pp64-5).
13. Fairfax, *Short Memorial* op. cit.